CUP Web site

RSS Feed

New Books

Author Interviews

Author Events

Keep track of new CUP book releases:

For media inquiries, please contact our
publicity department

CUP Authors Blogs and Sites

American Society of Magazine Editors

Leonard Cassuto

Mike Chasar / Poetry and Popular Culture

Erica Chenoweth / "Rational Insurgent"

Juan Cole

Jenny Davidson / "Light Reading"

Faisal Devji

William Duggan

James Fleming / Atmosphere: Air, Weather, and Climate History Blog

David Harvey

Paul Harvey / "Religion in American History"

Bruce Hoffman

Alexander Huang

David K. Hurst / The New Ecology of Leadership

Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh

Geoffrey Kabat / "Hyping Health Risks"

Grzegorz W. Kolodko / "Truth, Errors, and Lies"

Jerelle Kraus

Julia Kristeva

Michael LaSala / Gay and Lesbian Well-Being (Psychology Today)

David Leibow / The College Shrink

Marc Lynch / "Abu Aardvark"

S. J. Marshall

Michael Mauboussin

Noelle McAfee

The Measure of America

Philip Napoli / Audience Evolution

Paul Offit

Frederick Douglass Opie / Food as a Lens

Jeffrey Perry

Mari Ruti / The Juicy Bits

Marian Ronan

Michael Sledge

Jacqueline Stevens / States without Nations

Ted Striphas / The Late Age of Print

Charles Strozier / 9/11 after Ten Years

Hervé This

Alan Wallace

James Igoe Walsh / Back Channels

Xiaoming Wang

Santiago Zabala

Press Blogs


University of Akron

University of Alberta

American Management Association

Baylor University

Beacon Broadside

University of California

Cambridge University Press

University of Chicago

Cork University

Duke University

University of Florida

Fordham University Press

Georgetown University

University of Georgia

Harvard University

Harvard Educational Publishing Group

University of Hawaii

Hyperbole Books

University of Illinois

Island Press

Indiana University

Johns Hopkins University

University of Kentucky

Louisiana State University

McGill-Queens University Press

Mercer University

University of Michigan

University of Minnesota

Minnesota Historical Society

University of Mississippi

University of Missouri


University of Nebraska

University Press of New England

University of North Carolina

University Press of North Georgia

NYU / From the Square

University of Oklahoma

Oregon State University

University of Ottawa

Oxford University

Penn State University

University of Pennsylvania

Princeton University

Stanford University

University of Sydney

University of Syracuse

Temple University

University of Texas

Texas A&M University

University of Toronto

University of Virginia

Wilfrid Laurier University

Yale University

Archive for the 'Security Studies' Category

Wednesday, September 1st, 2010

Interview with Ami Pedahzur — The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism

The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism
The following is a reprint of an interview with Ami Pedahzur, author of
The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism. The book is now available in paperback:

Q: Have you ever worked for the Mossad or any other intelligence agency?

Ami Pedahzur: No. never. I was a senior medic in the IDF, and there was nothing clandestine or exotic in that.

Q: So what led you to the topic of the Israeli secret services and their struggle against terrorism?

AP: When I was six years old, IDF stunned the world when its elite forces released the Israeli and Jewish Hostages of Air France flight 139, who were being held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in Entebbe, Uganda. Like most of the kids of my generation, I idolized the heroic soldiers and started reading whatever I could find about the Israeli struggle against terrorism. I have not stopped since then.

Q: One cannot avoid noting the critical tone in your book. What happened? What made you change your outlook?

AP: Well, after a decade of studying terrorism and especially during the second Intifada with the long campaign of suicide attacks, I started asking myself the following question: If Israel is indeed such a superpower in counterterrorism as it wants the world to believe, why has terrorism against Israelis only intensified and become more deadly over the years?


Thursday, August 26th, 2010

Avner Cohen — Bringing Israel’s Bomb Out of the Basement

Avner Cohen, Worst-Kept SecretIn an op-ed from yesterday’s New York Times Avner Cohen, author of the forthcoming book The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb, and Marvin Miller argue for Israel to end its policy of opacity regarding its possession of nuclear weapons.

As Cohen and Miller explain, “Israel neither affirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons; indeed, the government refuses to say anything factual about its nuclear activities, and Israeli citizens are encouraged, both by law and by custom, to follow suit.” This policy has been in effect since Richard Nixon and Golda Meir brokered a secret pact in which the United States would tolerate and shield Israel’s nuclear program as long as Israel did not advertise possession of nuclear weapons.

However, Cohen and Miller contend this policy jeopardizes the Middle East peace process and Israel’s standing in the international community. Cohen and Miller write:

Israel needs to recognize, moreover, that the Middle East peace process is linked to the issue of nuclear weapons in the region. International support for Israel and its opaque bomb is being increasingly eroded by its continued occupation of Palestinian territory and the policies that support that occupation. Such criticism of these policies might well spill over into the nuclear domain, making Israel vulnerable to the charge that it is a nuclear-armed pariah state, and thus associating it to an uncomfortable degree with today’s rogue Iranian regime.


Thursday, July 8th, 2010

Avner Cohen on Israel’s “Secret” Nuclear Arsenal

Earlier this week, NPR’s All Things Considered interviewed Avner Cohen author of the forthcoming The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb.

In the interview Cohen discusses Israel’s policy to never publicly acknowledge that it has possession of nuclear weapons. He also analyzes the ways in which Obama has accepted the policy of Israel’s opacity about the issue.

He describes how a tacit consensus developed among other nations that allowed Israel to have the bomb in light of the Holocaust and their situation in the 1960s. When pressed by Siegel whether “a policy … with deep roots in the postwar history” still made sense, Cohen responded:

Israelis believe so, and I think it’s a great deal a matter of habits. I think it’s time to start looking afresh on this, slow, responsibly to try to find a way to normalize those issue and to find a better way for Israel to come clean with it.

I think the world is ready, even most of the Arabs are ready. So I think that ultimately Israel with the rest of the world, it would be nice not to have nuclear weapons, to be part of the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. But I think the time has come to think in a responsible way how for Israel to come clean, to come with putting its nuclear weapons on the table.

To listen to the full interview:

Friday, June 25th, 2010

Kings of War

Kings of War

Every so often we like to feature blogs by Columbia University Press authors. Today we shine a spotlight on Kings of War whose contributors include three Columbia/Hurst authors: Robert Dover, co-editor of Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence; Patrick Porter, author of Military Orientalism:Eastern War Through Western Eyes; and John Mackinlay, author of The Insurgent Archipelago.

These authors and are all members of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. As you might have surmised the focus of the blog is on strategy, the military, war, and security. Recent posts have discussed the controversy surrounding and resignation of Stanley McChrystal, Wikileaks, the attack on the Gaza flotilla, and changes in the academic discipline of International Relations.

Here is a description of Kings of War from the site, detailing the scope of the blog:

Kings of War is about strategy, widely defined.

We assign each of our posts to one (or more) of seven “columns” – the tabs at the top of the page. Alanbrooke is about British national security and defense. Clausewitz deals with strategic theory. Galula explores counterinsurgency. Grant, like the U.S. general and president, is concerned with American grand strategy. Mao covers insurgency and terrorism. Thucydides is history. Turing, as in Alan Turing, reviews cyberwar and the virtual dimension of conflict.

Monday, April 26th, 2010

Foreign Affairs reviews three Columbia/Hurst books on Afghanistan

My Life with the TalibanIn a lengthy review essay in Foreign Affairs, Seth Jones, who is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, considers three books recently published by Columbia University Press/Hurst that explore the unique tribal and local nature of Afghan politics.

Empires of MudThe three books under discussion are My Life with the Taliban, by Abdul Salam Zaeef; Empires of Mud: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007, by Antonio Giustozzi; and Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, edited by Antonio Giustozzi.

As Jones points out, the books all provide important insights into the Afghan environment, one in which both Zaeef, the former Taliban leader, and Michael Flynn, U.S.
Decoding the New Taliban
deputy chief of staff for intelligence in Afghanistan, admit that the U.S. and NATO know very little about despite their long involvement in the region. Jones writes,

All three books provide a nuanced micro-level view of the country. More important, they offer a chilling prognosis for those who believe that the solution to stabilizing Afghanistan will come only from the top down — by building strong central government institutions. Although creating a strong centralized state, assuming it ever happens, may help ensure long-term stability, it is not sufficient in Afghanistan. The current top-down state-building and counterinsurgency efforts must take place alongside bottom-up programs, such as reaching out to legitimate local leaders to enlist them in providing security and services at the village and district levels. Otherwise, the Afghan government will lose the war.


Monday, April 12th, 2010

Avner Cohen and Joseph Cirincione on the Nuclear Summit

The historic two-day nuclear summit is getting underway in Washington but not without a few, if not many, questions hanging over the event.

One of the most controversial developments in the days leading up to the meeting was Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision not to participate in the meeting. According to Avner Cohen’s op-ed in Haaretz published yesterday entitled Israel missing a chance at nuclear global legitimacy, Netanyahu pulled out “after being told that a number of Arab leaders would vilify Israel’s nuclear policy and refusal to sign the treaty.” Cohen, who is the author of the forthcoming book The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb, laments the prime minister’s decision and argues that it reflects the weaknesses of its policy of nuclear opacity.

Cohen concludes his op-ed writing:

Opacity is widely perceived as concealment, an act of covering up a secret that cannot be revealed to the public. Today, however, the secret is known to all, so it’s unclear why it must remain wrapped in ambiguity. In a world demanding that Iran speak the truth over its nuclear activity, ambiguity is seen as a bizarre relic from the past.

If Israel’s prime minister feels he cannot uphold the country’s opacity policy at a relatively friendly international forum, it seems this policy is in real trouble. If he is worrying about stumbling into a nuclear ambush and cannot rely on understandings on nuclear issues reached with the U.S. government, it seems Israel’s diplomatic crisis with Washington is much deeper than we had imagined.

Cohen also talked about Netanyahu’s decision in an interview with RT America:


Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Connecting the dots — James Walsh on the recent attempted terrorist attack

James WalshOn his blog, Back Channels, James Walsh, author of The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, examines the blame game that resulted in the aftermath of the failed terrorist attack on Christmas.

While newspapers and former government officials have pointed to the failures of bad judgment or technology, James Walsh believes politics is to blame. He writes:

Neither people or technology are the root cause of the difficulties in sharing intelligence. Politics is. Government agencies all want to contribute to stopping terrorist attacks, but bring to the table different specific skills and priorities. These differences can make them reluctant to share intelligence with their counterparts. Some fear that their counterparts will reveal methods of intelligence collection that need to be kept secret or will expose information that the terrorist can use to plan their next attack. Others are reluctant to share intelligence that casts a shadow on their efforts or undermines their skills and priorities. On the flip side, some agencies are unwilling to make decisions based on information they did not collect and cannot themselves verify.

Walsh believes that a culture that prizes intelligence sharing might help the situation but he also expresses some skepticism:

One solution might be to foster an intelligence culture that rewards sharing. The military has had some success in promoting inter-service cooperation by, for example, rewarding officers that serve in other areas of the military or government. But this is not an overnight cure. At best, it might create a culture of greater sharing in the next generation of intelligence professionals. Politics can be tamed, but it won’t go away.

For more on the book, you can also read Walsh’s recent post about the attack on the CIA base in Afghanistan or read an excerpt from the book.

Monday, December 21st, 2009

Sharing intelligence with Pakistan — A post by James I. Walsh

James WalshEvery so often, we like to feature blogs maintained by Columbia University Press authors. Today, we look at Back Channels, a blog by James I. Walsh, author of The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing.

As Walsh describes it, he uses the blog to “write about how social scientists analyze bad things such as terrorism, political violence, and human rights abuses.” In his most recent post Intelligence Sharing with Pakistan: What It Might Look Like, Walsh examines how the interests of the United States and Pakistan both complement and contradict each other when it comes to stamping out Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Drawing on his book, Walsh suggests that finding an arrangement that would allow the U.S. and Pakistan to work together, something Obama and his administration surely hope can be achieved, might prove difficult because of U.S. concerns. Walsh writes:

Neither country [Pakistan or the United States] can trust the other to take actions that protect the long-run objectives of the other. But neither country can achieve its objectives without cooperation from the other. Is there a solution to this dilemma? In The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, I suggest that countries can successfully cooperate in such situations. They do so by creating a hierarchical intelligence sharing agreement, in which the more powerful state quietly directs and supervises many of the intelligence activities of the subordinate. This allows more powerful state to ensure that the subordinate is acting in a way consistent with its interests. In return, the more powerful country offers the subordinate much closer intelligence, economic, military, cooperation. The United States used such hierarchies with some success in cases as diverse West Germany during the Cold War, South Vietnam in the early 1970s, and some countries in the Middle East since 9/11.


Monday, December 7th, 2009

James Igoe Walsh takes the page 99 test

The International Politics of Intelligence SharingTaking Ford Maddox Ford’s suggestion to heart (“Open the book to page ninety-nine and read, and the quality of the whole will be revealed to you”), The Page 99 Test asks authors to focus in on this particular page.

Recently Kelly Oliver took the test and now James Igoe Walsh, author of The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing explains what page 99 of his book reveals about the larger arguments he is making regarding the complexities of governments working together to obtain more reliable intelligence.

Here is an excerpt from Walsh’s piece on The Page 99 Test:

“My” page 99 starts out with a detailed summary of the complaints that political leaders in the European Union have made about their counterparts’ willingness to share intelligence…. It is an example, though, of the key barrier to effective intelligence sharing, which is that one state cannot reliably insure that another is living up to promises to share fully and honestly.

It begins to suggest [the] solution is closer European integration of intelligence activities. That is, these countries would be better off if they applied some of the institutions they have developed to govern trade or money to intelligence sharing. A key benefit these institutions provide is the ability to monitor partners to determine if they are complying with their promises to share. You will have to keep reading, though, if you want to find out why this is unlikely to happen.

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Steve Coll on Decoding the New Taliban

DecodingIn the New Yorker blog, Think Tank , Steve Coll praised Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, edited by Antonio Giustozzi calling it “an outstanding and important collection.”

Coll cites two essays from the collection, one that examines Taliban propaganda and communication strategies and another that analyzes the Taliban-affiliated networks of founded by Jalalauddin Haqqani, the former Central Intelligence Agency asset whose followers apparently were responsible for the kidnapping of New York Times reporter David Rohde.

Coll concludes the piece, writing:

Overall, the work Giustozzi has pulled together here is as up-to-date as scholarship can be. There is an emphasis on how the Taliban have evolved and changed in local settings since 2001. Equally striking, however, is the portrait that accumulates of the Taliban’s continuity. The book’s essays describe how national and provincial figures from the nineties-era Taliban government, formally known the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, remain intact and operate as a shadow administration, holding portfolios similar to their previous ones.

The Taliban were not shattered in December, 2001, and then forced to reassemble. Rather, their national government in Kabul and Kandahar retreated into exile in Pakistan, survived a relatively brief period of disarray, and then reassembled itself to return to its southern and eastern strongholds in Afghanistan.

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

The Taliban aren’t so tribal


This month the Le Monde Diplomatique Web site has a fascinating podcast interview with Patrick Porter, author of Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes, about his recent article “Culture Wars in Afghanistan.”

In the article and interview, Porter, who is also a lecturer in the Defense Studies Department at the British Defense Academy, King’s College, University of London, argues that while the United States’ is right to recognize that military and technological superiority is not enough to win the war in Afghanistan, the turn to culture is not without its problems. More specifically, Porter believes that the U.S. understanding of Taliban and Afghan culture falls prey to essentializing and misunderstanding.

The belief that the Taliban is a rigid, tribal culture has led the United States to underestimate its enemy’s ability to change. The Taliban can be realists and have changed their position on narcotics, suicide bombing, and even music to help further their cause. For instance, they often produce propaganda in the form of hip hop or find justification in the Koran to support suicide bombing. Moreover they embrace both technology and the profits from the trade in narcotics to help their efforts.

Porter concludes his article, writing:

Culture matters. New attention to the social worlds of foreign societies has helped the US army reform itself as more effective and humane. In a war of insurgency, communal conflict or state breakdown, it helps to be prepared.

But because culture can be treated at many levels of sophistication, the word should always make us nervous. We may never banish the mythologized Oriental from our consciousness. Like fear of death and darkness, it is too powerful to be fully exorcized and will remain a silhouette on our mental horizon. But the fluidity and hybridity of the Taliban and al-Qaeda demonstrate that war jumbles and connects as well as polarizes. No culture, however strange, is an island.

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

Interview with Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, authors of Jewish Terrorism in Israel

Jewish Terrorism in IsraelThe following is an interview with Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, authors of Jewish Terrorism in Israel.

You can also read an interview with Pedahzur discussing his previous book The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism or browse the book using Google Preview.

Q: What led you to this topic?

Ami Pedahzur: We have both studied political extremism and violence for many years. Together we have devoted a lot of time to understanding the underlying causes of terrorism in general and of religious terrorism in particular. When former prime minister Ariel Sharon announced his plan to remove Jewish settlements from the Gaza strip, we felt that Israeli society was entering a tense historical moment. Because of this we just wanted to be on the ground, documenting events as they unfolded and trying to understand the mechanisms that lead groups and individuals to extreme manifestations of political violence.

Q: So what are your main conclusions?

AP: This study corroborates the argument that religion by itself is not a source of violence. However, when it becomes politicized, religion can become a fertile breeding ground for countercultures like totalitarian political ideologies such as fascism and communism. Most countercultures never become violent. It takes a major threat to the community of believers or to its most sacred values to radicalize its members. A minority of them will be pushed over the edge and perpetrate terrorist acts for the purpose of removing the threats.

Q: Lately, a lot has been written on religious terrorism. Could you outline, in a nutshell, the new insights that this book offers?

AP: As we indicated earlier, we contend that the real divisions in the world are not between civilizations and religions but rather between moderates and extremists. We also concluded that many terrorist acts are not generated by organizational frameworks but by more elusive social configurations based on primal ties such as kinship and friendship. One of the most stunning findings in the book is that the most sophisticated terrorist group in Israel’s history, which is known as the “Jewish Underground,” exhibited no features of a terrorist organization. It was rather an extended social network that included many subgroups operating independently at different times and in different locations. There was no leader or central command. The first time many of the alleged members of the underground met was in court, following their arrest.

Q: What can you say about the “profile” of the Jewish terrorist?

AP: The overwhelming majority of the terrorists were young religious males, yet these facts alone are too simplistic a description. If we were asked by an intelligence service how to profile a potential terrorist, we would probably have recommended looking at the bigger picture. Instead of identifying potential individual terrorists on the basis of their of their socio- demographic or religious proclivities, we believe the focus should be on radical communities in times of crises. Once such a community is identified, the next step should be concentrating on networks of friends who are highly invested in the struggle, meet frequently, and have access to weapons. As with criminal street gangs, the turn to terrorism is gradual and involves a process of socialization within a close-knit network. Very few of the Jewish terrorists were lone wolves operating on their own. The majority, including Yigal Amir, the assassin of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, were radicalized and developed their tactics through a peer socialization process.

Q: What can this book tell us about the shape of things to come?

AP: We believe that history can tell us a lot. We open the book by describing Jewish terrorism in ancient times, and, unfortunately, in the ensuing two thousand years little has changed. Over the last forty years extremists have created a religious Jewish counterculture, especially in the West Bank but also in Orthodox pockets inside Israel. Though we are not anticipating removal of more settlements in the near future, we are confident that this day will come, and once it does, the escalation of violence will be dramatic. Terrorist networks will do anything to prevent the government from interfering with what they perceive as the promise of the lord to the Jewish people, even if the toll in human lives is very high.


Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

The Daily Kos interviews Joe Cirincione

Joseph CirincioneIn addition to his recent piece in the Huffington Post, Joe Cirincione, author of Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, was also interview by Daily Kos.

Cirincione has been discussing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which is developed by the Pentagon and determines policies and weapons systems for the next five to ten years and is usually done once during a president’s administration. Ciricione’s main concern is that despite Obama’s ambitious plan to cut back on nuclear weapons, the White House’s lack of involvement in the NPR might mean that the interests of the pentagon and defense contracts will win out at the expense of weapons reduction. As Ciricione puts it:

So the nuclear bureaucracy—that is, the nuclear laboratories, the defense contractors, the ideologues, and the small section of the military still involved with nuclear weapons understand this, and they are waging a battle to basically tweak the current Cold War structure to make it—to pay lip service to Obama’s agenda without actually changing much of anything.

So we could very easily end up with… “Bush light”: the Bush nuclear policies and posture tweaked just a bit, and given an Obama gloss. If the Pentagon has its way, that’s what’s going to happen.

Tuesday, May 26th, 2009

Pyongbang!: Washington’s Korea Conundrum” — Victor Cha on North Korea

Nuclear North KoreaThough written after North Korea’s failed missile launch earlier this Spring, Victor Cha’s article on the Foreign Affairs Web site speaks to this weekend’s events.

Victor Cha, co-author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies , argues, “So while Obama should continue to extend the hand of negotiation to Pyongyang, his administration should also embark on two other tracks: in the short-term, calculated pressure to punish Pyongyang’s missile launch, and in the longer-term, preparing for a united peninsula, free and democratic.”

Cha then lays out steps the United States should take in response to North Korea:

First, the United States should enforce Resolution 1718 and reimpose economic sanctions, including financial sanctions to target entities that finance ballistic missile development. These types of sanctions, similar to ones used in 2005 and 2006, hit at the personal riches of the North Korean leadership that are stashed away in accounts in Europe and Asia and can be very effective. They were lifted in 2007 in light of North Korea’s agreement to allow international inspection and disablement of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but it is time for similar instruments to be put to use again.

Second, Obama should consider restoring North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, using the revelations of Pyongyang’s help to Damascus’s nuclear program as justification.


Tuesday, May 12th, 2009

Israel and the Bomb

Avner CohenLast week both Andrew Sullivan, in a post on his blog on the Atlantic, and Stephen Walt, writing for his blog on Foreign Policy blog, considered Israel’s denial of having a nuclear arsenal.

Sullivan wondered why the United States pretends that Israel does not have the bomb and suggests that this denial complicates the issue of Iran’s desire to have a nuclear bomb and adds to the instability of the region.

Stephen Walt, like Sullivan, expresses no objection to Israel having a nuclear arsenal, but argues that past reasons for not coming clean about it are no longer relevant. However, admitting to having the bomb, will undoubtedly complicate Israel and the United States’ attempts to deny Iran the bomb.

Walt writes:

Today, one could argue that the Israeli government could reassure its citizens about a possible “existential” threat from Iran by advertising its own far more impressive nuclear capability and reminding its that any Iranian attack on Israel would be an act of national suicide. The problem, of course, is that calling attention to Israel’s existing arsenal weakens the case for opposing Iran’s nuclear programs. And that might be part of the answer to Sullivan’s query: Israel can’t declare that it is a nuclear weapons state when it’s trying to convince the rest of the world that it’s totally illegitimate for Iran to become one too.

In the article, Walt cites Avner Cohen’s Israel and the Bomb as an excellent study of the history of the Israeli nuclear program. Cohen’s forthcoming title Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb: Democracy, Secrecy, and Taboo examines how the secrecy surrounding Israel’s nuclear program undermines the norms and values of liberal democracy while also being inadequate to deal with a nuclear threat from Iran.

Friday, April 24th, 2009

Antoine Bousquet’s The Scientific Way of Warfare Takes the Page 99 Test

Scientific Way of WarfareThe Page 99 Test is an intriguing Web site that takes up Ford Maddox Ford’s suggestion that if you “”Open the book to page ninety-nine and read, and the quality of the whole will be revealed to you.”

Antoine Bousquet has done this with his book The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity. Here’s what he had to say:

P.99 of The Scientific Way of Warfare discusses the role of the scientist John von Neumann in the development of two technologies that would play a central role in the Cold War, namely nuclear weaponry and the computer. It is representative of the book as a whole in that the latter is concerned with the complex and intimate relationship of science and war since the dawn of the modern age. The Manhattan Project has been often portrayed as the moment of science’s loss of innocence but science had in fact long been intertwined with military activity from the early proximity between the study of ballistics and the formulation of the laws of motion in the seventeenth century.


Tuesday, April 21st, 2009

“Obama Was Right to Release Torture Memos.” — Jameel Jaffer

Administration of TortureYesterday, we featured Jameel Jaffer’s interview with Glenn Greenwald on Salon and today we point your attention to Jaffer’s post on the Free Speech Blog.

Jameel Jaffer, who is the co-editor with Amrit Singh of Administration of Torture: A Documentary Record from Washington to Abu Ghraib and Beyond, argues that with the release of the memos “the public can now better understand the nature of the CIA’s interrogation and detention programme, and the role that Justice Department lawyers played in developing and implementing it.”

Jaffer disputes the points made by Michael Mukaskey, former attorney general under George W. Bush, and former CIA director Michael Hayden in their Wall Street Journal op-ed. Mukasksy and Hayden argued that the release of the memos would make CIA interrogators timid and ultimately jeopardize the safety of the United States. However, Jaffer suggests:

It does not compromise national security to broadcast to the world that the US will eschew methods that are criminal under US and international law, that the State Department has described as torture, and that the United States has previously prosecuted as war crimes. Indeed, to propose that the nation’s security would be compromised by that message is to propose that the nation’s security would be compromised by the rule of law.

Friday, April 10th, 2009

“Pirates are Winning” — Martin N. Murphy

Martin MurphyWith the recent hijacking of the Maersk Alabama by Somali pirates, it is no surprise that Martin N. Murphy, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington D.C. and author of Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World, has been asked to comment.

In the Guardian, Martin Murphy argues that despite the efforts of various navies to prevent piracy, the “pirates are winning” and have found ways to get around whatever safeguards have been established. In an article on the Wired Web site, Murphy points to the difficulty of legal prosecution as another stumbling block in deterring piracy. After two decades of civil war, the Somali legal system is not functional and the world’s navies have no clear legal rights. Thus, in many cases, the Somali pirates are just let go after they are captured. As Murphy states, “the potentials for legal embarrassment are quite numerous” for the United States and other nations with ships vulnerable to piracy.

For more, there is a video of Murphy discussing the links between piracy and terrorism. And, here is a short excerpt from Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, in which Murphy warns of piracy’s ability to distract from efforts to combat terrorism:

“Terrorism at sea while currently a minor threat to international order has the potential to develop. If current trends continue, it is likely that the sea will become a more contested space, one which terrorists are likely to be presented with more potential targets and more opportunities to mount attacks….

There may be no proven links between pirates and terrorists, but in some contexts pirates (and criminals generally) can nonetheless assist terrorists by sustaining a milieu that deflects intelligence and law enforcement attention away from terrorist activity. Criminals such as pirates and smugglers do not have to cooperate with terrorists to achieve this affect; they can help them inadvertently by simply going about their normal business.”

Thursday, March 26th, 2009

The Israeli Secret Services vs. Terrorism — A Post by Ami Pedahzur

Ami PedahzurIn an article written for Middle East Strategy at Harvard , Ami Pedahzur argues that the resources now being spent on counterterrorism operations should be allocated to other national security needs and that it is time for Israel and other nations to think more creatively about how to combat terrorism.

This takes up the argument that Pedahzur makes in his recent book The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism, in which he contends that defensive (improving security in public areas, improving domestic intelligence, etc.) rather than offensive, military measures are far more effective in reducing terrorism.

Moreover, policymakers fearing the political fallout from terrorist attacks tend toward aggressive, high-profile responses and that “this process is reinforced by the fact that the angry leaders naturally seek the advice of the security establishment. Most military and intelligence officers are trained to see any challenge from a narrow offensive perspective, and do not have a full grasp of the political and social causes and implications of terrorism and counterterrorism. Thus, they are likely to provide policymakers with a relatively limited set of aggressive options for response.”

Ultimately, this leads to a vicious cycle of violence that proves costly to governments. Citing the Israeli example, Pedahzur writes:

While the state enjoys superiority in technology and firepower, the insurgents usually fight within a well-known territory and easily assimilate among non-combatants. This leads the states to use air strikes and artillery attacks and thus to cause collateral damage amongst civilians. This vicious cycle eventually enhances popular support for the insurgents, as was reflected in Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon and 2009 war in Gaza. In most cases, after a long war of attrition, the state, which launched the attack and refused to negotiate with the terrorists, will cut a deal with them either through direct or indirect negotiations. In terms of winning or losing, such a scenario actually strengthens those who initiated the campaign of terror in the first place.

Wednesday, January 28th, 2009

Why Israel Has Failed to Stop Terrorism.

Yesterday, we ran an interview with Ami Pedahzur about his new book The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism. In the interview, Pedahzur explores why Israel has failed to stop terrorism despite the amount of resources it has devoted to counterterrorism. Pedahzur argues that the Israeli strategy, based on a “war model,” has often been motivated more by political and psychological goals rather than strategic ones. In considering the recent offensive in the Gaza strip, Pedahzur writes, “This operation, like many Israeli counterterrorism offensives in the past, seems to be driven by the policy makers’ desire to show the terrorized public that they are determined to inflict pain on the enemy.”

In an excerpt from the book, taken from the chapter “Fighting the Terrorism Plague,” Pedahzur expands on his points and lays out some policy recommendations. In place of a “war model’ that emphasizes assassination and other dramatic violent acts, Pedahzur suggests Israel adopts a defensive model that consists of three main stages: prevention, crisis management, and reconstruction. Pedahzur writes,

Over the years, terrorism aimed at Israel has become more aggressive, and the civilian home front has become the front line. The Israeli war model, which has also been replicated in other countries, has not proven to be a success in meeting its goals. In order to effectively contend with terrorism, it is incumbent to transfer the bulk of counter­terrorism activity to alternative models…. Policymakers themselves intensify the fear [of terrorism] by warning the public of the unavoidable revenge. Hence, not only do such assassinations not undermine the capabilities of the various terrorist groups to attack, but they also intensify the terrorists’ desire to prove their viability by amplifying the psychological fear factor. Clear and honest statements by politicians who tell the public that terrorism, despite its horrific outcomes, rarely poses a major threat to the state’s national security would be welcome in that connection. Such statements would reassure the public and undermine the attempts of the terrorists to create a continuous state of fear, chaos, and mistrust of the public in its leaders. Beyond mitigating the psychological impact of terrorism, policy-makers should allocate resources and formulate a defensive model that consists of three main stages: prevention, crisis management, and reconstruction.